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Abstract: Using data on road accidents, traffic fatalities and driving offences taking place 
in Italy over the period 2001-2005, we estimate the effects of the introduction on July 2003 
of a penalty point system for driving offences. To identify the causal effect of the penalty 
point system on road safety we use a Regression Discontinuity Design. It emerges that, 
controlling for weather conditions, police patrols, speed cameras, gasoline price, the 
introduction of the penalty point system has led to a reduction of about 10% of road 
accidents and of about 25% of traffic fatalities. These findings are robust to different 
specifications of the model and different time windows. Moreover, it emerges that the 
driving offences for which the introduction of the new regime has determined a sharp 
change in the sanction scheme have reacted more than offences for which the change was 
less relevant.  
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st July 2003, following the experience of many other countries, a penalty point system for 
driving offences has been introduced in Italy. Under this system, drivers are sanctioned, in case 
of traffic violations, with the loss of a number of points (according to the severity of the 
offences) from a total of 20 points assigned initially. If a driver loses all the points, in case of 
repeated traffic violations, the driving license is revoked and he/she has to pass a new exam – 
after a compulsory deprivation period – to get his/her license back. 
  In practice, the penalty point system, in addition to the traditional monetary sanctions 
(fines), imposes non-monetary sanctions on drivers consisting in the withdrawal of the driving 
license. The rationale of this mechanism is that drivers – in part because they are protected by 
the auto insurance coverage or because they are unable to evaluate the accidents’ consequences 
– fail to fully internalize the social costs of the accidents that they might provoke. 
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The aim of the penalty points system – representing a sharp increase in the severity of 
sanctions for reckless drivers and inappropriate driving behaviour – was to induce drivers to 
behave more carefully, promote safety and address the intolerable levels of fatalities and serious 
injury on Italian roads: about 7,000 people died in car accidents in Italy in 2002 while 370,000 
were seriously injured. Road accidents are the leading cause of death for people under 45 years. 
Bourgeon and Picard (2007) have recently proposed a theoretical model showing that 
non-pecuniary sanctions (such as the suspension or withdrawal of the driving license) for traffic 
violations may be more effective than monetary sanctions. In fact, the efficacy of fines may be 
limited for drivers with a higher income; moreover, the withdrawal of the driving license has the 
advantage to prevent chronically reckless drivers through incapacitation effect. 
The aim of this paper is to show whether the increased level of deterrence determined 
by the penalty points system has proven successful in reducing the number of road accidents 
and fatalities in Italy. Our straightforward hypothesis is that if the penalty point system induces 
individuals to drive more safely, a lower number of crashes will follow and, in addition, the 
severity of crashes should be lower, leading to a lower number of fatalities and injuries. 
We use a panel dataset providing information on a daily basis on road accidents, traffic 
fatalities and injuries, and driving offences over the period 2001-2009. Data are from the Italian 
National Police (Polizia di Stato). To recover the causal effect of the penalty point system on 
road accidents and related fatalities we use a Regression Discontinuity Design exploiting the 
fact that the assignment to the treatment is determined by time being on the right hand side of 
the fixed threshold 1
st July 2003. Jumps in the relationship between road accidents and time in 
the period close to the introduction of the penalty point systems are taken as evidence of a 
treatment effect. In fact, even if time may itself affect our outcome of interest, for example 
because cars become safer or people become more aware of traffic risks, this association should 
be smooth. A similar approach, using time as a forcing variable in a regression discontinuous 
design model, has been followed by Davis (2008) in examining the effects of driving 
restrictions imposed in Mexico City in 1989 on air quality. 
Our estimation results show that, controlling for seasonal effects (month of the year and 
day of the week), number of police patrols and speed cameras, weather conditions, gasoline 
price (an exogenous proxy for traffic intensity), the introduction of the penalty point system has 
determined a significant reduction in the number of road accidents and of related fatalities and 
injuries. In our basic specification, considering a symmetric two year window around the 
implementation of the penalty point system (1
st July, 2001 – 1
st July, 2005), it emerges that the 
new regime has reduced road accidents of about 10%, while the effect on the number of traffic 
injuries and fatalities is stronger, showing a reduction of respectively 15% and 25%. These 
findings are robust to different polynomial time trends and to the use of interaction terms 
between the treatment variable and the temporal trend. A negative and highly statistically   3
significant impact on all our variables of interest emerges also when we focus on a narrow time 
window, considering, for example, a year before and a year after the implementation of the new 
system or a six month window.  
In addition, thanks to the availability of information on the number of per day driving 
offences detected by public authorities, we have analyzed the effect of the new regime on this 
variable. As regards this variable, we are able to exploit both changes occurring over time 
(before and after 1
st July 2003) and across different types of offences. In fact, the penalty point 
system introduced in Italy in 2003 did not modify in a homogeneous way sanctions for all types 
of driving offences. For some types of offences, the new system has determined a significant 
change, exposing the driver to the risk of having withdrawn the driving license, while for other 
types of offences the change was less relevant, since these were already punished under the old 
system with the suspension of driving privileges. From our analysis, it emerges that the impact 
of the penalty point system has been very strong for the first type of offences, while a weaker 
effect is found for those offences that were already punished harshly by the old system. This 
heterogeneous impact on offences, according to the change in the sanction scheme introduced 
by the penalty point system, reassures us that the effects we have estimated are not driven by 
other factors that may have occurred simultaneously to the implementation of the new scheme. 
Our paper is related to the growing literature investigating the effects of automobile 
safety regulations on traffic accidents and related fatalities. Traynor (2009) examines the 
concomitant impact of three different policies that some U.S. states have implemented to induce 
safer behaviour of drivers and passengers. Empirical findings support the hypothesis that these 
policies, by imposing restrictions on teen driving and driving under the influence of alcohol, 
have produced a statistically significant impact on traffic safety reducing annual fatality rates. 
On the other hand, the law imposing the use of seat belts does not seem to have played any 
relevant role. This result may be due to the well known Peltzman (1975) effect:  drivers wearing 
seat belt feel more secure and drive less carefully increasing total fatalities. However, there are a 
number of other works showing that seat belt use reduces the fatality risk among car occupants. 
Cohen and Einav (2003) use state panel data for the period 1983-1997 to evaluate mandatory 
seat belt law and  conclude that these laws are effective in reducing traffic fatalities. In a similar 
vein, Levitt and Porter (2001a) analyse the effectiveness of seat belts and air bags in preventing 
deaths in motor vehicle crashes. Using data for fatal crashes occurring in the years 1994-1997 in 
U.S., they find that seat belts are more effective in reducing the risk of death than air bags. 
  Among the main determinants of traffic fatalities many scholars have focused on the 
effects of maximum speed limits. Results are not conclusive: while some studies show that 
higher limits result in an higher number of traffic fatalities, other works support the so called 
“speed spillover hypothesis”, that is higher speed limits on rural interstates produce additional 
hazards on other roadway types. Houston (1999), using data for U.S. states, suggests that higher   4
speed limits have negative safety consequences on roads directly affected by these limits, but 
produce a reduction in accidents and related fatalities taking place on other roads.  
Road accidents are strongly influenced also by the driver behaviour, for example in 
terms of alcohol or drug use, phone usage while driving, car maintenance. Levitt and Porter 
(2001b) estimate the likelihood of a fatal crash for drinking drivers, using data on fatal accidents 
in U.S. They find that drinking drivers are at least seven times more likely to cause fatal crashes 
than sober drivers. Their results suggest that policies focused on stopping erratic drivers might 
be successful. Similarly, Grabowski and Morrisey (2001) find that increasing the minimum 
legal drinking age decrease fatalities among younger drivers. 
Using state-level panel data on mobile phone ownership, hands-free laws and traffic 
fatalities, Kolko (2009) finds that mobile phones are positively correlated with traffic fatality 
rates, while hands-free laws are associated with lower fatality rates. 
Poitras and Sutter (2002) have tested the effectiveness of safety inspections on vehicles 
– inducing drivers to improve mechanical condition of vehicles and to increase the level of 
maintenance. They find that inspections do not increase maintenance and mechanical soundness 
of cars on the road. Furthermore, in inspecting states the number of old vehicles declines but 
casualties do not. 
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we present the institutional 
framework and the data we use. Section 3 carries out the empirical analysis considering the 
effect of the penalty point system on road accidents and related fatalities and injuries. Section 4 
analyses the effect on different types of driving offences. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Setup and Data 
2.1. The Driving License Point System in Italy 
Punishments for infringements of road regulations belong to two categories: monetary sanctions 
and license deprivation as suspension or withdrawal. Major traffic offences, such as driving 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, often carry a mandatory suspension of driving license 
and drivers may incur other serious penalties like imprisonment. Less severe traffic violations 
are recorded in many countries through a penalty point system according to which authorities 
subtract points to drivers on conviction for road traffic offences.
1 Notwithstanding the 
implementation of the penalty point system varies among countries, the general operating 
principles are the same.  
                                                      
1 Depending on the particular system in use, points may either be added until a threshold is reached (the 
so-called Demerit Point System typically used in the US) or be subtracted from a given score until zero 
(the so-called Penalty Point System adopted in many European countries).   5
On 1
st July 2003 a Penalty Point System (PPS hereafter) for driving offences was 
introduced in Italy (Law no. 214/03). Each driver is credited with an initial driving score of 20 
points. This score is reduced by deducting a number of points when the driver commits traffic 
violations. The number of points deducted varies according to the severity of the offences. For 
example, ignoring a red traffic light is punished with 6 points of penalty, driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drug is punished with 10 points, overcoming the speed limit of 40 Km/h 
with 10 points, failing to wear a seatbelt or using a mobile phone with 5 points, and so on.
2 The 
loss of points comes in addition to monetary sanctions. When the number of points reaches zero, 
the driving license is withdrawn and the driver must take a new driving test. 
The introduction of this new system has determined an increase in the penalties for 
traffic violations that is not homogenous across different offences. Whereas it has determined a 
severe increase in the punishment of some types of violations, the change was relatively less 
relevant for other types of offences. On the one hand, for offences such as driving at a 
dangerous speed,
3 driving without wearing some safety devices (seat belts and helmets), which 
were punished under the old system only with monetary sanctions, the new regime has added a 
non-pecuniary penalty (the loss of a certain number of points), exposing the driver to the risk of 
suspension of his driving license.
4 On the other hand, for offences such as driving at an 
excessive speed, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, which were already harshly 
punished under the old systems (with the mandatory suspension of driving license and 
imprisonment),
5 the new system, adding to those sanctions the subtraction of 10 points, has 
determined a relatively minor change. 
2.2. Data  
This section briefly describes the data used in our empirical analysis and their source.  
In Italy, police departments are required by law to submit detailed information on each 
automobile crash. Three different bodies are in charge for accidents taking place on Italian 
roads: a) the Municipal Police (“Vigili Urbani”) for accidents occurring in urban areas (65% of 
the total); b) the National Police and c) the “Carabinieri” (another Italian military force) for 
accidents occurring in other areas (35%).  
The National Police maintains a database of road accidents and driving offences, freely 
available at http://www.poliziadistato.it/pds/stradale/archivio, which covers about 20% of the 
                                                      
2 The penalty points are doubled if a driver commits traffic violations in the first three years after passing 
his driving test. The driver may reconstitute all or part of his score by committing no further breaches for 
a period of two years. Every 2 years drivers receive a bonus of 2 points until a maximum of 30 points. 
3 Driving at a dangerous speed concerns a number of driving behaviours, such as driving at a very low 
speed, not maintaining safe distances from other vehicles, etc., and is very different from offences related 
to driving at an excessive speed. 
4 The Law no. 214/03, introducing the penalty point system, has also doubled the monetary fines for 
violation regarding the use of helmets on motorcycles and the use of seat belts. 
5 Excessive speeding was punished with the mandatory suspension of driving privileges when the speed 
limit was exceeded by more than 40 Km/h.   6
total number of accidents. Notwithstanding these data do not cover the entire universe of 
accidents, they constitute a representative sample and accidents recorded in this dataset 
represents a nearly constant proportion of the total number occurring over time (see ISTAT, 
2009). Unfortunately, data recorded by the Municipal Police and by the “Carabinieri” are not 
publicly available. 
The dataset at hand provides information on a daily basis of road accidents, traffic 
fatalities and injuries occurring on highways and other roads over the period 1
st March 2001- 
31
st December 2009 and on different types of traffic violations detected by the National Police 
during the same period of time. Even though we have data from 2001 to 2009, as we explain in 
Section 3, in our main specifications we focus on a symmetric two year time window before and 
after the introduction of the PPS (from 1
st July 2001 to 30
th  June 2005). Data are recorded 
separately for main highways and other roads and, as a consequence, we have two observations 
for each day. We use a dummy variable Highways to denote events occurring on highways. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis (in 
this Table we add up data occurring on highways and other roads). The number of per day road 
accidents has significantly decreased after the introduction of PPS, from 309.6 to 255.4. A sharp 
reduction is observed also for traffic injuries (passing from 228.4 to 180.5) and fatalities 
(passing from 7.1 to 5.2). 
This reduction in the number of road accidents and related fatalities is consistent with 
national data provided by ISTAT which show that the total number of accidents has changed 
from 263,100 in 2001 to 240,011 in 2005, while fatalities has decreased from 7,096 to 5,818. 
As explanatory variables we use an indicator of weather conditions obtained averaging 
the daily precipitations (provided by the European Climate Assessment & Dataset ECA&D)
6 in 
10 Italian cities located across different geographical areas (North-East, North West, Center, 
South and Islands). To control for traffic intensity, we consider monthly gasoline prices 
(Ministry of Economic Development), which should be exogenous, instead of using the gasoline 
sales that might be endogenous. 
We also have information on the monthly number of police patrols and speed cameras 
operating respectively on highways and other roads,
7 which allows us to control for the effort 
made by public forces to detect and then avoid traffic violations. In Table 1 it is possible to see 
that both the number of police patrols and of speed cameras has increased in the period 
following the introduction of the PPS. 
 
                                                      
6 Data are available at http://eca.knmi.nl. See Klein et al. (2002). 
7 The dataset we use provides information of the number of police patrols starting from September 2004. 
Data on police patrols and on speed cameras for the period going from March 2001 to September 2004 
were kindly provided by Antonio Nicita, who obtained the data from the Traffic Police Directorate 
(Direzione della Polizia Stradale).   7
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Daily data: 1st July 2001 to 30th  June 2005 
Variable Mean  Sd  Min  Max  N 
Before the introduction of PPS 
Road Accidents   309.608 53.146  204 611  730 
Injuries   228.404 64.709  95 548  730 
Fatalities  7.063 3.658  0 23  730 
Police patrols  297887.3    20359.07    266402  340572  730 
Speed cameras  3156.24    624.4372    2390  5161  730 
          
After the introduction of PPS 
Road Accidents   255.371 38.950  149 399  731 
Injuries   180.510 49.951  75 443  731 
Fatalities  5.157 3.086  0 27  731 
Police patrols  334679.7    18544.77    303510  369059  731 
Speed cameras  3459.159    581.1021    2686  5110  731 
          
Other Controls – 2001-2005 
Precipitations  21.365 42.459  0 348  1461 
Gasoline Price  1.083 0.057  0.992  1.220  1461 
Holiday  0.033 0.178  0  1  1461 
Sources: Italian National Police, European Climate Assessment & Dataset ECA&D, Ministry of 
Economic Development. 
 
In the next section, to better understand the effects of the PPS on the outcome variables 
we use a regression discontinuity design to disentangle the effects of the PPS from other 
possible confounding factors. 
 
3. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of the 
Penalty Point System 
The aim of our analysis is to empirically investigate whether the introduction of the PPS for 
driving license has determined a reduction of road accidents and fatalities in Italy, assuming that 
the frequency of road crashes and fatalities is strictly related to the drivers’ behavior: when 
inappropriate and dangerous behavior are sanctioned more harshly, we expect that drivers tend 
to drive more safely, respect signals and speed limits, wear seat belts or helmets, do not take 
alcohol or drugs, etc. This, in turn, will determine a minor number of accidents and will help at 
reducing the negative consequences of accidents. 
Formally, we define the dummy variable  t PPS  equal to one for observations after the 
introduction of the penalty point system at time  2003 July    1 0
st t = and 0 otherwise: 
      
2003     1   t    0














To recover the effect of  t PPS  on the number of per day road accidents and related 
casualties we use a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design in which the treatment status  t PPS  
is a deterministic and discontinuous function of time (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009). Following most of the papers in the literature, we use a parametric approach.   8
In general, sharp regression discontinuity design compares the outcomes of units just 
above the threshold with the outcomes of units just below the threshold. Therefore, we compare 
the road accidents and fatalities just before and after the cutoff date of 1
st July 2003. Obviously, 
traffic accidents might be related to time for a variety of reasons: technological progress making 
cars safer; road maintenance and investments in safe road infrastructures; an increasing drivers’ 
awareness of  traffic risks; population aging, since older people tend to be more careful, and so 
on. However, the effects of time can be controlled using temporal trends. Under the assumption 
that the relationship between the outcome variables and time is continuous in a neighborhood of 
0 t , any jump in the dependent variable in proximity of the cutoff point can be interpreted as 
evidence of a treatment effect. 
  We model the number of per day road accidents and fatalities using the following 
model: 
[1]        ( ) t t t t t f X PPS Y ε β φ + + + =    
where  t Y  is our outcome of interest (alternatively, Accidents,  Injuries and Fatalities),  φ  
measures the effect of the penalty point system,  t X  is a vector of control variables including 
month of the year, day of the week, an indicator for holidays, the monthly number of police 
patrols and speed cameras, average daily precipitations, average monthly gasoline price, a 
dummy for highways,  () t f  is a flexible functional form for the effect of time, 
()
p
pt t t t f γ γ γ + + + = ...
2
2 1 , which, in our main specifications, we model with a fifth grade 
polynomial, and   t ε  is an error term. 
Our main estimates focus on the period July 2001-July 2005, a two year window around 
the implementation of the PPS .
8 The chosen period of analysis is due, on the one hand, to the 
need to avoid longer time spans during which other institutional changes might have taken place 
(for example, in 2006 a number of other laws concerning road traffic safety have been 
implemented). On the other hand, in the Regression Discontinuity Design approach (see Imbens 
and Lemieux, 2008; Davis, 2008) it is recommended to focus on observations distributed within 
a distance Δ on either side of the threshold  0 t :  [ ] Δ + Δ − 0 0 ,t t . Therefore, we focus on a 
symmetric time window and, due to the lack of data before 2001, we are constrained to a two 
year maximum symmetric window. 
As a robustness check, in section 3.1, we estimate our model focusing on alternative 
time windows. In all estimates, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
correlations within 7 lags. 
                                                      
8 Estimating a standard regression on a window of width Δon both sides of the cutoff point amounts to a 
non-parametric estimation method using a rectangular kernel (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).   9
In columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2 are shown OLS estimates of equation [1] for, 
respectively, Accidents, Injuries and Fatalities. It emerges that, controlling for temporal trends 
and covariates, the introduction of the PPS has led to a reduction in the number of daily 
accidents of 13.9, that is, a reduction of about 8.8%. The coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. Similar effects emerge also in columns (2) and (3): the PPS is associated 
with a reduction of about 20.9 injuries (–18%)  and with a reduction of about 1 fatality per day 
(nearly –28%).  
 
Table 2. RD estimates of PPS effects - 1
st July 2001 – 30
th June 2005 
   OLS        Poisson   
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
 Accidents  Injuries  Fatalities    Accidents  Injuries  Fatalities 
Penalty  Point  System  -13.9921*** -20.8851*** -1.0062***   -0.1033*** -0.2163*** -0.3528*** 
 (3.4434)  (3.5997)  (0.3364)    (0.0231) (0.0283) (0.0990) 
Holiday -8.8324***  21.7648***  0.4844**    -0.0613***  0.1981***  0.1547** 
 (2.9942)  (4.2162)  (0.2388)    (0.0225) (0.0337) (0.0693) 
Precipitations 0.3021***  0.1556***  0.0002    0.0019***  0.0014***  0.0000 
 (0.0166)  (0.0149)  (0.0012)    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Gasoline Price  32.1300  -6.5495  -0.5002    0.3122*  0.2524  0.2408 
  (25.8986) (27.1321) (2.4352)    (0.1842) (0.2374) (0.7922) 
Police patrols  -0.0000  0.0000  0.0000    -0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0000)    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations 2922  2922  2922    2922  2922  2922 
(Pseudo)  R-squared    0.5844  0.8056  0.3672    0.3512 0.6992 0.1810 
Log-likelihood        -15467.8  -15755.4  -5802.0 
Notes: The Table reports RD estimates. All specifications are for July 2001-July 2005 and include a fifth order polynomial time 
trend, indicator variables for month of the year, day of the week and for accidents occurring on highways. Standard errors (reported 
in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations (up to 7 lags). The symbols ***, **, * indicate that 
coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
In order to take into account that our dependent variables take non-negative discrete 
values, we have also used a Poisson estimator. Estimation results, reported in columns (4)-(6), 
are widely consistent with OLS estimates, but the magnitude of the effects is significantly 
larger. It emerges a reduction of about 10.3% in road accidents (t-stat=–4.48), of 21.6% in 
traffic injuries (t-stat=–7. 64) and of 35.3% in traffic fatalities (t-stat=–3.56).
9 
As regards control variables, it emerges that road accidents and related casualties follow 
a seasonal pattern, with peaks in July and December; they are more frequent on Saturdays and 
on Sundays, probably because of drunk-driving, which is more common during weekends, 
especially among young people (dummies for month of the year and day of the week are not 
reported to save space). Drunk driving may also explain the coefficient on the dummy 
Holydays, which is negative when considering road accidents, implying that during holidays the 
number of road accidents reduces, probably because of a lower traffic intensity, but is positive 
on the number of traffic injuries and fatalities, suggesting that the pool of drivers tend to be less 
careful leading to more serious consequences when an accident occurs. Weather conditions play 
                                                      
9 Very similar results are obtained using a negative binomial estimator.   10
a very relevant role both in explaining the number of accidents and the number of injuries, 
which increase with precipitations, while they are not statistically significant in explaining the 
number of traffic fatalities. Gasoline price and the number of police patrols are not statistically 
significant as regards all our outcome variables. Finally, the dummy variable Highways shows 
that the number of accidents occurring on highways is smaller.  
One of the main advantage of Regression Discontinuity Design is that it allows a 
transparent graphical analysis. We first deseasonalize our dependent variables by regressing 
them on dummies for month of the year and day of the week. The deseasonalized values plotted 
against time are shown in Figure 1 (panel a: Accidents; b: Injuries; c: Fatalities). In this Figure 
are also represented the predicted values from a fifth order polynomial trend estimated 
separately on each side of the cutoff point. The vertical line at the 1
st July 2003 denotes the day 
in which the PPS was introduced. In the three panels of Figure 1, it clearly emerges a jump in 
the relationship between the outcomes and the time variable in the proximity of our threshold 
point. 
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The estimates reported in Table 2 are based on a sample composed of 2 observations per 
day, the first for accidents occurring on main highways and the second for accidents taking 
place on local roads. In Table 3 are reported Poisson estimates separately for each types of road. 
From these estimates it emerges that the PPS has reduced accidents and related fatalities 
occurring both on highways and on local roads.
10 However, the effect is higher in magnitude on 
accidents occurring on local roads. 
 
                                                      
10 As an alternative, we have summed up observations for highways and local roads, obtaining the total 
number of daily traffic accidents. Estimates using this sample are very similar to those shown in Table 2.   12
Table 3. RD estimates for accidents and casualties occurring on Local Roads and Highways 
(Poisson estimates) 
    Roads       Highways  
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
  Accidents Injuries Fatalities    Accidents Injuries Fatalities 
Penalty Point System  -0.1673***  -0.2503***  -0.3722***   -0.0367* -0.1489*** -0.2271* 
  (0.0238) (0.0325) (0.1147)    (0.0216) (0.0392) (0.1369) 
Observations  1461 1461 1461    1461 1461 1461 
Pseudo R-squared  0.3468  0.4580  0.0936    0.2049 0.2985 0.0400 
Log-likelihood -6939.7  -8043.9  -3263.3    -7279.5 -7315.1 -2503.9 
Notes: The Table reports RD estimates of PPS. All specifications are for July 2001-July 2005 and include a fifth order 
polynomial time trend, indicator variables for month of the year and for day of the week, dummies for holiday, 
monthly number of police patrols, precipitations, gasoline price. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations (up to 7 lags). The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients 




3.1. Robustness Checks 1: Different Polynomial Time Trends  
The consequences of the misspecification of the functional form in terms of biased estimates of 
the treatment effect are particularly serious in RD design contexts. Following Angrist and 
Pischke (2009) who suggest to verify the robustness of results to different polynomial trends, in 
Table 4 we replicate the same specifications shown in Table 2, considering different polynomial 
time trends, from the first to the eighth order.
11 Across all the time trend specifications, it 
emerges a clear effect of the PPS on all our outcome variables.  
 
Table 4. Sensitivity of RD estimates to the polynomial time trend order (Poisson estimates) 
Polynomial time trend  Accidents  Injuries  Fatalities 
First  order  -0.0891*** -0.1526*** -0.2234*** 
  (0.0199) (0.0439) (0.0749) 
Second  order  -0.0892*** -0.1535*** -0.2292*** 
  (0.0197) (0.0439) (0.0753) 
Third  order  -0.0796*** -0.1552*** -0.2752*** 
  (0.0243) (0.0528) (0.0884) 
Fourth  order  -0.0757*** -0.1552*** -0.2704*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0529) (0.0903) 
Sixth  order  -0.1114*** -0.2233*** -0.3601*** 
  (0.0302) (0.0667) (0.1155) 
Seventh order  -0.1114***  -0.2207**  -0.3638** 
  (0.0410) (0.0931) (0.1661) 
Eighth order  -0.1078***  -0.2175**  -0.3649** 
  (0.0412) (0.0935) (0.1663) 
Observations  2922 2922 2922 
Notes: The Table reports RD estimates of PPS. All specifications are for July 2001-July 2005 and include 
indicator variables for month of the year and day of the week, dummies for holiday and highways, monthly 
number of police patrols, precipitations, gasoline price. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations (up to 7 lags). The symbols ***, **, * indicate that 
coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
                                                      
11 We do not report the fifth order already presented in Table 2.    13
  In order to not impose any restriction on the underlying conditional forms, we include 
among controls interaction terms between the polynomial time trend and our treatment variable 
With the aim to interpret the coefficient on  t PPS  as the treatment effect, the terms of the time 
trend have been defined as  0
~ t t t − = . Therefore, we estimate the following model: 





p t t t
PPS t PPS t PPS t
t t t X PPS Y
ε γ γ γ
γ γ γ β φ
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
~ ... ~ ~                               






In Table 5, in which are reported only Poisson estimates,
12 it emerges that estimates of 
φ  turn out to be very similar to those discussed above, but the effects become larger in 
magnitude when the polynomial order increases. In all specifications, and for all our outcome 
variables, the effect of PPS is negative and highly statistically significant. 
 
Table 5. RD estimates with interaction terms (Poisson estimates) 
Polynomial time trend  Accidents Injuries Fatalities 
First order  -0.0910*** -0.1566*** -0.2328*** 
  (0.0154) (0.0199) (0.0632) 
Second order  -0.0877*** -0.1741*** -0.3006*** 
  (0.0200) (0.0248) (0.0866) 
Third order  -0.1181*** -0.2508*** -0.4399*** 
   (0.0320) (0.0397) (0.1425) 
Fourth order  -0.0992*** -0.1968***  -0.4286** 
   (0.0385) (0.0469) (0.1751) 
Fifth order  -0.1202*** -0.2140***  -0.5259** 
   (0.0449) (0.0530) (0.2123) 
Sixth order  -0.1510*** -0.2737***  -0.5128** 
  (0.0481) (0.0562) (0.2360) 
Observations  2922 2922 2922 
Notes: The Table reports RD estimates of PPS. All specifications are for July 2001-July 2005 and include indicator 
variables for month of the year and day of the week, police patrols, precipitations, gasoline price, dummies for 
holiday and highways, interaction terms between the terms of the time trends and  t PPS . Standard errors (reported in 
parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations (up to 7 lags). The symbols ***, **, * indicate 
that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
3.2. Robustness Checks 2: Different Time Windows 
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we now look only at data in a neighborhood around the 
discontinuity. The comparison of average outcomes in a small enough neighborhood to the left 
and to the right of the threshold value should estimate our effect of interest in a way that does 
not depend on the correct specification of the model for the conditional expected function.  
  We experiment focusing on three different time intervals: the first including a year 
before and a year after  0 t , the second considering six month before and after  0 t  and the last 
focusing on a three months window. In Table 6 are reported results obtained from our local 
                                                      
12 OLS estimates are very similar, but not reported to save space.   14
linear regressions. In all specifications, the PPS produces a reduction of road accidents and 
related fatalities but the effect becomes smaller in magnitude as the time interval is shortened. 
When we consider a three month interval, the effect of PPS is imprecisely estimated and 
it becomes not statistically significant for traffic fatalities. However, given the importance of 
seasonal effects for our outcome variables (road accidents tend to be more frequent during 
summer), estimates obtained when focusing on very short time windows, where it is not 
possible to control for seasonal factors, may be downward biased. 
 
Table 6. RD estimates with alternative time windows (Poisson estimates) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Time window  Accidents  Injuries  Fatalities 
01 July 2002 – 30 June 2004  -0.1451***  -0.2095***  -0.2562*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0427) 
Observations  1462 1462 1462 
01 Jan 2003 – 31 December 2003  -0.0786*** -0.1126*** -0.1863*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0164) (0.0519) 
Observations  730 730 730 
01 April 2003 – 30 September 2003  -0.0586***  -0.0417*  -0.1322 
  (0.0210) (0.0237) (0.0848) 
Observations  366 366 366 
Notes: The Table reports RD estimates of PPS. All specifications include indicator variables for day of the week, 
dummies for holiday and highways, monthly number of police patrols, precipitations, gasoline price. The 
specification focusing on 1
st July 2002 – 30
th June 2004 time window also includes dummies for month of the year. 
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations (up to 6 lags). The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level. 
 
As a further robustness check we extend the analysis to the entire period covered by our 
data, going from 1
st March 2001 to 31
st December 2009. As shown in Table 7, also for this large 
temporal span, the PPS has proven effective in increasing road safety. The impacts on road 
accidents (-10%), on injuries (-15%) and on fatalities (-24.5%) are very close to estimates 
obtained in other specifications of our model. 
 
Table 7. RD estimates for accidents occurring on Local Roads and Highways. 1st March 2001 – 31 
December 2009 (Poisson Estimates) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Accidents  Injuries  Fatalities 
Penalty  Point  System  -0.0972*** -0.1538*** -0.2450*** 
 (0.0150)  (0.0194)  (0.0618) 
Observations 6394  6394  6394 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.3704 0.6738 0.1835 
Log-likelihood -32425.8464  -33532.5881  -12057.4584 
Notes: The Table reports RD estimates. All specifications include indicator variables for month of the year and for 
day of the week, dummies for holiday and highways, monthly number of police patrols, precipitations, gasoline 
price and a fifth order polynomial trend. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations (up to 8 lags). The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
In Figure 2 we plot the deseasonalized values of accidents and the predicted values from 
a fifth order polynomial trend against time. From the Figure it clearly emerges a marked jump in   15
proximity to the introduction of the PPS. The temporal trend of road accidents is decreasing and 
the PPS seems to have produced a shift in the intercept.  
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4. The Heterogeneous Effect of the PPS on Different Types of 
Traffic Offences 
 
The introduction of the PPS has determined an increase in penalties for traffic violations, which 
is not homogenous across different types of offences. In fact, while it has determined a severe 
increase in the punishment of some types of violations, for other offences the change was 
relatively less relevant. Offences such as driving without seat belts or helmets and driving at a 
dangerous speed (Type A Offences) were punished only with a monetary sanction under the old 
system and the PPS has added to the fine a non-pecuniary sanction – the loss of a certain 
number of points – which exposes the driver to the risk of driving license withdrawal. For other 
infringements – such as driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and driving at an 
excessive speed (Type B Offences) – the increase in penalty was less dramatic, since these 
offences were already punished very harshly under the old system (mandatory suspension of 
driving privileges and imprisonment in addition to pecuniary penalties). The PPS has added to 
these sanctions the subtraction of a number of points. 
Therefore, for Type A Offences the new system has determined the passage from a 
pecuniary sanction scheme to a more complex scheme involving the risk of withdrawal of the 
driving license. On the other hand, for Type B Offences, the withdrawal of the driving license 
was already in force under the old system, and the change introduced by the PPS was less 
relevant.   16
To analyze whether the impact of the PPS was heterogeneous across different type of 
offences, we exploit the fact the our dataset also provides detailed information on the number of 
traffic offences detected by the National Police each day. For the period we consider (a 
symmetric two year window around the implementation of the PPS), data are available for six 
different type of offences
13: driving at a dangerous speed (Dangerous Speed), driving without 
seat belts (Seat Belts), riding a motorcycle or a scooter without a helmet (Helmet), excessive 
speeding (Excessive Speeding), driving under the influence of alcohol (Alcohol), driving under 
the influence of drug (Drug). Since in this analysis we use many interaction terms, for the sake 
of simplicity we added up observations for highways and other roads ending up with one 
observation per day. 
As shown in Table 8, in which some descriptive statistics are presented, the introduction 
of PPS is associated to a drastic reduction of the number of detected offences for driving at a 
dangerous speed and driving without safety devices, while offences related to driving at an 
excessive speed and under the influence of alcohol or drugs have increased after July 2003. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Detected Road Offences. Daily data: 1
st July 2001 – 30
th June 
2005 
Variable Mean  Sd  Min  Max  N 
Before the introduction of PPS 
Dangerous speed (Type A)  221.662  40.074  75  456  730 
Helmet (Type A)  189.856  119.446  10  583  730 
Seat belts (Type A)  684.837  167.919  66  1505  730 
Excessive speeding (Type B)  1772.877  984.545  198  9018  730 
Alcohol (Type B)  57.518  40.652  13  311  730 
Drugs (Type B)  3.338  4.254  0  61  730 
          
After the introduction of PPS 
Dangerous speed (Type A)  178.927  34.611  54  356  731 
Helmet (Type A)  47.260  33.431  2  225  731 
Seat belts (Type A)  299.528  71.559  30  744  731 
Excessive speeding (Type B)  2463.312  914.529  125  8807  731 
Alcohol (Type B)  63.341  50.902  14  377  731 
Drugs (Type B)  4.164  3.730  0  37  731 
Sources: Italian National Police. 
 
In the following we undertake an econometric analysis to disentangle the impact of PPS 
on traffic offences, controlling for a number of potential determinants.  
To this aim, we stack observations referring to each type of offence obtaining a dataset 
composed of 8,766 units (1,461 daily observations times 6 different types of offences) in order 
to statistically test – using interactions terms – the impact of PPS on offences of different type. 
We estimate the following model: 
[2]        ( ) ( ) t t t j j j tj t f X PPS A ε β μ φ μ + + + ⋅ + =   
                                                      
13 Starting from September 2004 data are available also for offences related to unauthorized speed 
competitions, to vehicle lighting system use and to headphone and speaker phone system use.   17
where  tj A  are detected road offences of type j committed in day t,  j μ  are dummies to denote 
each type of offence and the interaction terms ( ) t j PPS ⋅ μ  allow to estimate separately the 
coefficients  j φ , representing the specific impact of PPS on each type of offence,  t X  is a vector 
of control variables, including all the regressors used in the previous analysis,  () t f  is a fifth 
grade polynomial for temporal trends, and  t ε  is an error term. 
As shown in column (1) of Table 9, once we control for weather conditions, traffic 
intensity, seasonal factors, monthly number of police patrols, from Poisson estimates it emerges 
that the PPS has reduced on average of about 39% the number of traffic offences. To analyze 
whether the effect has been heterogeneous across different types offences, in column (2), we 
add among regressors interaction terms between the different types of offences and the dummy 
PPS, leaving as reference category offences for Excessive Speeding. Estimates show that the 
effect has been very relevant for those offences, such as Seat Belts, Helmets and Dangerous 
Speed, for which the new system has determined a major change in the sanction scheme, while a 
weaker effect emerges for offences, such as Alcohol, Drugs and Excessive Speeding, for which 
non pecuniary sanctions were already in force before the introduction of the PPS. For the 
reference category, which includes offences for driving at a speed exceeding 40 Km/h the limit 
(already punished under the old scheme with the withdrawal of the driving license), the effect is 
negative, but not statistically significant. 
 
Table 9. The Impact of PPS on Driving Offences. 1
st July 2001 – 30
th June 2005 (Poisson Estimates) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Penalty Point System  -0.3949***  -0.1082  -0.1149* 
  (0.0635) (0.0682) (0.0677) 
PPS*Dangerous Speed    -0.5431***   
   (0.0246)  
PPS*Seat Belts    -1.7195***   
   (0.0415)  
PPS*Helmet   -1.1559***   
   (0.0254)  
PPS*Alcohol   -0.2325***   
   (0.0486)  
PPS*Drug   -0.1079*  
   (0.0621)  
PPS*Type A Offences      -1.0572*** 
     (0.0245) 
Observations  8766 8766 8766 
Log-likelihood -441834.8  -309572.3  -327049.7 
Notes: The Table reports RD estimates. All specifications include indicator variables for the type of offences, 
month of the year and for day of the week, dummies for holidays, monthly number of police patrols, 
precipitations, gasoline price and a fifth order polynomial time trend. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations (up to 7 lags). The symbols ***, **, * indicate that 
coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
To better understand whether the effect of the PPS was significantly different for 
different types of offences, in column (3), we jointly consider Type A Offences and leave as   18
reference category Type B Offences. The coefficient on the PPS dummy is negative and 
statistically significant at 5 percent level, suggesting that the introduction of the new system has 
led to a reduction of about 11% of Type B Offences. The coefficient on the interaction term Type 
A Offences*PPS is negative and highly statistically significant, suggesting a much stronger 
impact of PPS on Type A Offences. 
Similar findings emerge when we experiment with different polynomial time trends, 
when we use interaction terms between the treatment variable and the temporal trend and 
focusing on different time windows.  
These heterogeneous effects imply that the PPS has been more effective in reducing 
those offences for which it has determined a radical change in the sanctioning scheme and give 
further support to the finding that the PPS has helped at increasing traffic safety in Italy.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzes whether the increased level of deterrence determined by the penalty points 
system introduced in Italy in July 2003 has proven successful in reducing the number of road 
accidents and related fatalities.  
Our analysis is based on a rich dataset, from the Italian National Police, providing daily 
information on the number of road crashes, traffic fatalities and driving offences. We use a 
Regression Discontinuity Design and compare traffic accidents and related fatalities before and 
after the introduction of the PPS. Controlling for seasonal factors, weather conditions, traffic 
intensity, number of police patrols, polynomial time trends, it emerges that the PPS has 
produced a relevant negative effect on all our outcomes of interest. The introduction of the PPS 
has reduced road accidents of about 10%, while the effect on the number of traffic injuries and 
fatalities has been, respectively, of about 15% and 25%. These findings are robust to different 
polynomial time trends and to the use of different time windows.  
From our analysis it also emerges that the PPS has determined a reduction of the 
number of per day driving offences detected by the National Police. Since we control for 
monitoring intensity (police patrols and speed cameras) we interpret these findings as the causal 
effect of the increased deterrence determined by the introduction of PPS. 
In addition, we show that the effect of the PPS is heterogeneous across different types 
of offences. The new regime has determined a strong reduction of those offences for which a 
main change occurred in the sanctioning scheme, while the effect has been weaker for those 
offences which were already punished under the old system with non pecuniary sanctions, such 
as the withdrawal of the driving license. This heterogeneous impact on different types offences 
reassures us that the positive effect of the PPS on traffic safety is not driven by other factors that 
may have occurred simultaneously to the introduction of the PPS.    19
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